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The experience of high and growing levels of urban unemploy­
ment has been a characteristic feature of economic performance in 
a large number of developing economies which have begun industriali­
zation in the post-war period. Detailed descriptions of this pheno­
menon can be found in a number of studies, notably Turnham (1971) 
and Squire (1979). It has also been a feature of post-war indust­
rialization in Yugoslavia. Unemployment in the socialized sector 
(mainly urban, mainly non-agricultural) increased from 4.9% in 
1957 to 7.6% in 1967 and then to 12.1% in 1977. The most recent 
OECD report (1983) records some 826,000 job-seekers ^  in 1982.
This phenomenon took place in conjunction with mass worker 
emigration abroad which developed following the reforms of the 
mid-sixties as more liberal, outward-looking policies were intro­
duced. By 1973 more than one million Yugoslav workers were employed 
abroad, mainly in the Federal Republic of Germany. Following years 
saw a fall off in these numbers as the onset of recession in Western 
Europe closed off job opportunities for migrant workers, and led to 
the introduction of more restrictive immigration laws. Needless to 
say, the observation of high levels of unemployment and of emigration 
appears somewhat disturbing in a labour-managed economy where
"workers' sovereignty" is valued at least equally with "consumers'
2 )sovereignty" as an objective of social and economic policy.
In section 1 the conventional explanation of the Yugoslav 
unemployment experience is discussed and criticized. In section 2 
the basis of an alternative approach is set out, and a formal model 
is developed in section 3. In section 4 the empirical results are 




























































































1. The Conventional Explanation
The dominant approach to the analysis of the Yugoslav non-
agricultural sector, at least for the post-1965 reform period, has
been the application of the neoclassical theory of the "labour-
3)managed firm" . There are several respects in which the Yugoslav 
"self-managed firm" differs from this prototype, especially in 
regard to the simplifying assumption of the thoery that the labour- 
managed firm seeks to maximize disposable income per head of the 
workforce. In his magnum opus Vanek (1970) was careful to empha­
size the distance between the pure theory and Yugoslav practice. 
Nevertheless, a number of studies have revealed a congruence 
between the predictions of theory and the empirical evidence
4)available from post-reform Yugoslavia (Estrin, 1979, 198ln 1982)
The short-run version of the theory was initially set out by 
Ward (1958), and Vanek (1970). In static equilibrium the firm's 
demand for labour is such as to maximize income per worker. When 
material costs, capital stock and hours per worker are fixed 
exogenously, and price is given to the firm on a competitive 
market, then equilibrium occurs where marginal value product 
per worker equals the value of average product per worker net 
of per-worker capital costs. This equilibrium balances the 
contradictory pressures of expansion, (required to spread the 
fixed capital costs over the largest number of workers) and 
contraction (since the distribution of revenues over the smallest 
number would be to the advantage of those employed). Thus equi­
librium labour demand, given product price, is essentially deter­




























































































by market processes. (In contrast, equilibrium labour demand of 
firms in a capitalist economy, given product price, is determined 
by both technology and labour market conditions which determine 
the ruling wage.) When product price varies, so does labour de­
mand. But again there is an important distinction from the capi­
talist case, since equilibrium labour demand varies inversely with 
price. In this setting, fiscal and monetary policies designed to 
stimulate the economy and raise the demand for labour will be un­
successful. The model illuminates "a perverse universe" in which 
"a rise in effective demand reduces employment, which increases 
investment to set up new firms, which increases effective demand 
which increases unemployment . . .  a vicious circle of positive 
feedback" (Meade, 1973, p. 409).
The long-run case has been investigated in Furubotn (1971, 
1976) and in Pejovich (1973, 1976). Here the goal of the firm is 
to maximize the discounted stream of expected future income. How­
ever the particular institutional constraints of self-management 
in Yugoslav practice— in particular the property-rights structure 
— will prevent the worker-managed economy from attaining a full- 
employment equilibrium over time. The problem arises, since work­
ers can save for their future consumption by two methods, (a) a 
privatised method through individual savings deposits, or (b) a 
cooperative method, by reinvesting some proportion of the firm's 
net income within the firm itself. The theory suggests that work­
ers will be more inclined to the former method since collective 
assets of the firm are "non-owned" and the investment, being em­
bodied in enterprise assets, is not recoverable by any individual 




























































































much higher rate of return is required to induce investment within 
the firm relative to that required to attract individual invest­
ment in savings deposits. Where bank credit is available the sit­
uation may be remedied to some extent, and internal investment 
within the firm may be increased. But this will not happen to the 
same extent as the increase in bank credit so long as this is fun­
gible, since bank credit may then act as a substitute for the 
self-financing of a firm's capital programme and may merely result 
in a larger allocation of income to consumption. As a result, in­
vestment, and hence employment, will be less than it need be, and 
unemployment may result. Pejovich concludes that the high un­
employment rate is at least in part, generated by the post-reform 
system in Yugoslavia" (i.e. by the system of self-management) 
(Pejovich, 1973, p. 301).
Now it was certainly the case, as Sapir (1980) and Estrin 
(1982) point out, that the trend rate of growth of output and em­
ployment was lower in the decade following the 1965 reform than it 
had been in the previous decade. Since it is usually argued that 
these reforms introduced a genuinely self-managed market economy 
for the first time, this evidence is taken as indirect support for 
the theories outlined above. However, looked at from a broader 
perspective, one could argue that the post-1965 experience has 
been pilloried unduly. In addition to an extension of economic 
decentralization to enterprises, one of the key objectives of the 
1965 reforms had been an increase in labour productivity and in 
international competitiveness, as previous import-substitution 
strategies of industrialization came to the limits of their effec­




























































































shake-out of labour a sharp credit squeeze was operated between 
1965 and 1967 (Bajt, 1967). Tyson (1979) points to a noticeable 
decrease in the ratio of firms' cash balances to their transac­
tions following the reforms. As a result there was a complete 
cessation in the number of new job openings between these years. 
Compared to the eight years before the reforms, when employment 
growth in the socialized sector had proceeded at an average rate 
of 4.5%, in the eight years following the reforms (1965-72) the 
average growth rate fell to 2% p.a. However if the exceptional 
years 1965-67 are excluded, the growth rate of employment in the 
subsequent eight years (1968-1975) was 3.5% p.a. On this view, 
although there was some fall-off in the rate of employment 
growth following the reforms, the change was not as dramatic as 
some have suggested.
As regards output attention has focused upon the output of
the industrial sector, which fell from a growth rate of 10.3%
f) )between 1958 and 1965 to one of 7.6% between 1966 and 1974.
This compares with a fall-off in employment growth in the sector 
from 5% p.a. to 3.3% p.a. over these years. These data should 
be interpreted cautiously, however. Moore has shown that if due 
attention is paid to the resource use involved in the structural 
changes initiated by the reforms and arguably required at the 
particular stage of development achieved by the Yugoslav economy 
at that time, then the overall decline in the growth rate of 
output and employment looks not only less precipitous, but also 
devoid of 'kinks' around the reform years. In addition, when 
the performance of the 1970's is compared with that of the 




























































































manufacturing output grew at a rate of 7.7%, whereas between
8)1970-1979 it grew at a rate of 6.9%. This seems to support
Moore's view that the growth retardation of the mid-sixties dis­
guised a period of "latent growth" during which structural 
changes were occurring. Finally, whilst Sapir suggests that, on 
the basis of international comparisons, Yugoslav rates of manu­
facturing growth were falling gradually below average following 
the reforms, evidence from the World Bank (1981) suggests the 
contrary. For the period 1960-70 the Yugoslav rate of growth of 
manufacturing output was exceeded in 19 out of a sample of 33 
"middle income" developing countries, and 8 out of 12 "industri­
al market economies", for the period 1970-79, the rate was ex-
95ceeded in only 9 of the former and none of the latter.
Moreover, the decentralized self-managed firms have been 
noticeably lacking in any tendency towards underinvestment, with 
the rate of gross capital formation remaining high by interna­
tional standards (Maddison, 1971). Tyson (1977) observes that 
during the 1965-71 period, "retained earnings accounted for 
about 30 percent of total domestic sources for fixed investment" 
(p. 396) and she goes on to show, using a simple permanent in­
come model of enterprise savings behaviour that the long-run 
target rate of saving out of enterprise net income was around 25 
percent. Accumulation increased at such a rapid rate after the 
reforms, in fact, that the aggregate capital-labour ratio in the 
industrial sector increased dramatically.
These empirical observations clearly run counter to the 
long-run arguments put forward by Furubotn and Pejovich. As 




























































































manaaed firms will want to invest, despite Furubotn-Pejovich ef­
fects, in order to maintain their market position: "If a single
self-manaaed firm persistently underinvests in an economy of oth­
er self-managed firms, it will find itself saddled with exces­
sively high costs, dwindling markets and dissatisfied workers"
(p. 397). Perhaps the economic behaviour of large self-managed
enterprises is not so very different from that of large capital-
1 0)ist corporations in this regard. The implications for the
static Ward-Vanek theory are not so clear. Estrin (1982) argues 
that the evidence on arowth retardation and increasing capital- 
intensity is consistent with predictions from the theory of the 
labour-managed firm, and this view is echoed by Sapir (1980). 
However we have seen that the growth retardation was not as se­
vere as they suggest, and it is not clear that the static theory 
is well tested by evidence concerning long-run trends in growth 
rates when the capital stock is changing. As argued in Estrin 
and Bartlett (1982) the issue of the relevance of the static the­
ory to the post-reform environment in Yugoslavia awaits some more 
research upon direct tests of the central hypotheses, such as 
those concerning supply response. A preliminary investigation by 
Stewart (1981) fails to detect any inverse association between 
labour demanded by an industrial sector, and relative prices. On 
the other hand, the evidence on increasing income dispersion af­
ter 1965 presented by Estrin (1979, 1981) does lend support to 
the idea that the 1965 reforms did increase the level of disinte­
gration on the labour market, enabling firms to set income levels 
with little regard to any market determined level of incomes.
There seems to be little evidence therefore to support the 




























































































social sector can easily be explained by appeals to the supposed 
disinclination of labour-managed firms to restrict employment, or 
to any fundamental slowdown in the rate of job-creation in the 
post-reform years. Moreover, there is little clear association 
between any slowdown in employment growth and the rise in unem­
ployment. For example, from 1965 to 1968 the number of social 
sector jobs fell by 21 thousand p.a., and unemployment rose by 15 
thousand per annum; and yet from 1972 to 1977, while social sec­
tor employment rose by 156 thousand p.a., unemployment was also 
rising dramatically by some 64 thousand per annum.
2. "Dual" development in Yugoslavia
So far we have concentrated our attention on one major fea­
ture of post-war Yugoslav industrialization— self-management. 
However, as we shall attempt to show below, the growth of unem­
ployment cannot properly be understood unless we also consider a 
further feature of fundamental importance to post-war industrial­
ization, namely the dualistic character of Yugoslavia's economic 
growth. Dualism has found a very clear expression through a num­
ber of closely related dichotomies: agricultural/industrial, ru-
ral/urban, private/socialized ownership, small/large scale, low/ 
high income. All these cleavages mirror and reinforce each oth­
er. Economic growth has been accompanied by a very rapid struc­
tural change which has increased the importance of the industrial 
sector relative to the agricultural. As late as 1970-1975 the 
ratio of agricultural to industrial labour force was diminishing 
at a rate of 9% p.a. This process is displayed in diagram (1).




















































































































































































































































































growth in developing economies, and a number of empirical regulari­
ties in the process have been investigated by Chenery and Syrcruin 
(1975). According to their analysis the industrial share of pro­
duction was well above the "average" aiven the level of development 
by 1965. This suggests that theories of dualistic growth may well 
hold some relevance for an analysis of post-war development in Yu­
goslavia. Whilst early models of dualistic development (Ranis and 
Fei, 1964, Kelly et al., 1972) considered that the market mechanism 
could be relied upon to guide the dualistic economy along a transi­
tional growth path characterised by full employment of labour re­
sources, later research indicated that dualism tended to be associ­
ated with marked differentials in sectoral income levels (Lipton, 
1977, part III). Under these circumstances dualistic growth can be 
expected to generate substantial urban unemployment (Todaro, 1969, 
1976, Bartlett, 1983). In this context it becomes clear that an 
adequate explanation of the unemployment phenomenon in Yugoslavia 
needs to concern itself with the supply side of the labour market,
in addition to the demand side considerations highlighted in our
11 )discussion of the self-managed enterprise.
That rural-urban migration has been an important feature of 
post-war development in Yugoslavia is indicated from a number of 
sources. Tanic (1979) reported that between 1946 and 1961 some 1.3 
million people left rural areas and migrated to the cities. The 
figure for 1961-1971 is given as 1.4 million. (Hawrylyshyn gives a 
similar estimate.) Other authors give a qualitative account of the 
social importance of rural-urban migratory flows on the basis of 
field studies and personal interviews (e.g. Halpern and Halpern 




























































































the growth of external migration, mainly to other European coun­
tries has been an additional feature determining labour supply to 
the social sector of the economy. From a figure of about 200 
thousand in 1965, the number of Yugoslav workers living abroad 
rose to 1.1 million by 1973, falling off somewhat thereafter as 
the West European economies began to place restrictions on in-mi­
gration in response to the developing economic crisis in their 
own e conomi e s.
Clearly, to the extent that net migration and natural labour 
force growth exceeds new job openings in the social sector, unem­
ployment will increase. As Shrenk et al. (1 979) observe, ''migra­
tion out of the agricultural sector has been accompanied at least 
in part by an increase in the ranks of the registered unemployed" 
(p. 246). But if unemployment is increasing the question arises 
as to why workers from the rural sector would continue to migrate 
to the urban sector in search of work. Singleton suggests that 
"the emphasis on large-scale heavy industry and the neglect of 
agriculture and light industry is a factor in stimulating a flow 
of workers out of rural areas into republican metropolises in ex­
cess of the opportunities available for a satisfactory urban 
life" (Singleton, 1979). More generally Shrenk et al. and Dubey 
(1975) have suggested that demand-pull considerations have been 




























































































3. Expected income, migration and unemployment
The basic hypothesis of the model is that intersectoral migra­
tion takes place in response to the expected income differential
1 2)between the two sectors. Expected urban incomes are the prod­
uct of actual average urban incomes (i) and the probability (p) 
that a migrant will find an urban job. This probability is given 
by the ratio of new job openincrs (Ê_ - E  ̂> where E is the level 
of employment) to the number of job seekers (U, the level of unem­
ployment) . Expected rural incomes are eaual to actual rural in­
comes (a) since the institution of peasant family farming ensures 
that all rural workers are absorbed in employment on the farm. Ur­
ban incomes are given exogenously, since, as was argued above, un­
der self-management income per worker is uniquely determined by the
capital stock and the technolocry, given the structure of relative
13)prices, and not by conditions on the labour market. Similarly we 
shall assume that rural incomes can be treated as an exogenous var­
iable, set either by subsistence requirements or by custom (so that 
state-regulated agricultural prices are set at a level sufficient 
to provide a customary real income to farmers). Other exogenously
determined variables include the rate of growth of emplovment in
14)the socialized (urban) sector (g), the natural rate of growth
. . 15)of the labour force (n), and the rate of external migration (x).
The fundamental equation of the model relates the rate of mi­
gration (m) from the agricultural sector to the expected income 
differential between the two sectors so that
m = m(p,i,a) (i)





























































































Et Et- 1P Ut- 1
or, in continuous time:
P qE _ g (1 - u) (ii)U u
The change in the unemployment rate (u) can be shown to be given 
by:
where X is the proportion of emigrants originating from the so­
cial sector, and 0 is the ratio of the agricultural to the non- 
agricultural labour force (the derivation is given in the Appen­
dix) .
Similarly, the rate of chanqe of the sectoral composition of 
the labour force is given by
The model thus contains 4 equations in 4 endogenous variables and
16)
6 exogenous variables.
Substituting (i) and (ii) into (iii) and (iv) gives a system 
of autonomous differential equations in u and 0 describing the 
structural transformation of the economy as industrialization 
takes place:
u = (1 - u) { (m - Xx) 0 - (g + Xx - n) } (iii)





























































































The motion can be displayed in a phase diagram, and is shown in 
diagram 2. Its qualitative features can easily be described. 
Put Z = (m - Ax) 0; Y = ( g + X x - n ) ;  V = x (1 - A)
then the system becomes:
u = (1 - u) (Z - Y ) (iii) '
0 = - (1 + 0)(Z+V) (iv) '
Clearly, when Z > Y, the rate of unemployment is rising. 
When Z < Y, the rate of unemployment is falling. When Z > -V 
the ratio of rural to urban labour, 0, is fallina. Thus so 
long as m > Ax holds, 0 will be falling. (In fact m will
never fall below Ax, since, should it do so, (Z - Y) becomes 
negative, the rate of unemployment falls and, by (i) and (ii) 
m will rise again).
Now consider as initial conditions the case where 0 is 
large and u is low such that Z > Y. Then u will be rising and 
so by (i) m will be falling. At the same time 0 will be fall­
ing. As both m and 0 fall, eventually Z will fall below Y, so 
that u will begin to fall. Now m will begin to rise, and al­
though 0 will continue to fall, there is a question as to 
whether u will fall off continuously. In fact it will do so 
since any faltering in u's decline will choke off the rise in m.
Thus the path of the unemployment rate over the structural 
transition associated with dualistic growth describes an in­
verted U-shape, at first rising and then falling off again.
The higher is A and x the sooner will the turnaround occur, 























































































































































































































































































The most important feature of the model, however, is that a 
higher rate of growth of employment, g, has an ambiguous effect 
since it creates more jobs, yet it attracts more migrants.
Two effects are relevant here. Firstly we want to know how 
the time-path of unemployment is affected by a change in the 
rate of job-creation, g. Secondly we want to know if the path 
peaks at a higher or lower unemployment rate as g is raised (or 
lowered). The first effect is detected by differentiation of 
equation (iii), so that given u and 9 we see how the unemploy­
ment velocity is affected instantaneously bv a change in g:
£ - m - » > < £ •  - 113cf 9g
as c $ = c (vi)m -0 ci
where 5 is the elasticity of migration with respect to a chance
in g, and t, . is the critical value of the elasticitv. We can ci
detect the second effect by considering the sensitivity of the 
u=0 locus as it is alonq this locus that the unemployment rate 
path peaks in the u-0 phase space. Let U|^_g = u, then from (iii) 
we have, upon implicit differentiation:
+ |S  |H \ 9 .  1 = 0dg du 3 g l










































































































Paths of the unemployment rate following an increase in the 
rate of employment growth, g.
u° : initial path of the unemployment rate 






















































































































































































The implications of these results for the path of the unemployment 
rate over time are shown in diagram 3. In the diagram the effects 
of an increase in the rate of job creation are indicated, and of 
course in all cases the effect is to shorten the time taken in 
achieving the structural transition, as an increase in g speeds up 
industrialization. Thus the peak unemployment rate will always 
occur sooner when g is higher. However whether the peak unemploy­
ment rate is raised or lowered under the higher growth policy de­
pends upon condition (vii) and is thus an empirical question; simi­
larly whether the time path is raised or lowered depends upon the 
way in which condition (vi) is fulfilled.
4. Empirical Results
We begin by estimating the migration function. Negative val­
ues of some variables preclude estimation in log form and so the 
equation has been estimated for the entire period in linear form 
with the following result:
Here bracketed figures refer to the t-statistic, N is the number 
of observations and DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for first 
order autocorrelation. The coefficients on the employment proba­
bility and the social sector income variables are sicxnificant at 
the 5% level and have the expected signs, that on agricultural in­
comes is significant at the 1 0% level only, but again has the ex-
2pected sign. The P. is high indicating that the equation explains
m = -0.01 + 0.047p + 0.34x10 5i 
(2.0) (8.2) (3.7)
2N = 20; R =
0.39x10 5a 
(2 .0)
0.89; DW = 1.85 (viii)




























































































tion of the residuals appears to pose no problem in this time- 
series estimate judging by the Durbin-Watson statistic, which 
lies just above the critical value d^ of 1.83. Thus surprising­
ly good confirmation of the underlying migration hypothesis is 
supplied by the data, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the migration probability mechanism is operating in such a way 
as to ensure that any increase in employment growth will induce 
an inflow of migrants into the social sector which will to a 
certain extent offset the initial favourable impact of the em­
ployment crrowth upon the numbers of the unemployed.
In diagram 4 time series plots of the migration rate, the 
expected income differential and the job probability are dis­
played. It is clear that much of the work is being done by the 
job probability variable, and indeed this variable recorded the 
smallest standard error on the parameter estimates.
We are now in a position to consider the policy implica­
tions of these results. Given a mean value of 0.04 for the mi­
gration rate and a mean value of 0.48 for the job probability, 
we can estimate the migration rate elasticity as
t -  | S . E  = 0 .69p m
£n equivalent value for the elasticity with respect to the rate
17)of employment growth can be calculated from equation (ii). 
However the critical value of the migration elasticity, £ ,
has an average value of 0.95. Since the average value of the 
migration elasticity lies below the critical value ( c is sig­
nificantly different from 0.95 at the 5% level) we conclude that 
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to lower the path of the unemployment rate over time. In confir­
mation C ., has an averaae value of 1.03, so that we can alsoCll
conclude that the peak unemployment rate would be reduced by a 
policy designed to increase the rate of growth of social sector 
employment. In other words perverse or paradoxical behaviour 
suggested as likely by Todaro (1976) can be ruled out. However 
we do not yet know directly the quantitative impact of employment 
growth upon unemployment. To see this we need to consider equa­
tions (iii) and (iv) above. It will be convenient to take a linear ap­
proximation to these equations for purposes of regression analy­
sis. Thus we have a linear model in difference equation form as 
follows:
0 t
a0 + al9t + a2?t + a3rt + a4Xt + a5Ut-1 + 61t
(-) (-) (+) (-)
b0 + V t  + V t  + b3rt + V t  + V t - 1  + e2t
(-) (-) (-) (+)
(ix)
(x)
Here r = i/a, since we have seen from (viii) that the effects of
i and a upon the migration rate are symmetrical, and so we can
save on degrees of freedom by taking their ratio. The expected
sign pattern of the coefficients is indicated below them in
brackets. We also expect to observe 0< a,. < 1, 0<  b_< 1,b b
meaning that we don't expect the model to show "explosive" behav­
iour. For these equations we expect â  < 0 and b̂  < 0 since we 
are using data for that part of the path across which the unem­
ployment rate is rising. Since the system is simultaneous we 
initially employ a two-stage least squares method of estimation.
The result for the unemployment rate equation is reported as 




























































































of having a high R (0.95) and an h statistic which is below the 
critical value of 1.645 (5% level), indicating an absence of seri­
al correlation in the residuals. The coefficients â  , a^ and a,, 
are sianificant at the 5% level, a^ at the 10% level and have the 
expected signs. However a^ (the coefficient on g) is insignifi­
cantly different from zero. This is an important result in view 
of our discussion of the migration function, and can be interpret­
ed to indicate that although the predicted impact of an increase 
in g upon the unemployment rate path is negative, the quantitative 
impact is so small, due to the additional migration that would be 
induced, as to be undetectable by the linear approximation esti­
mate used here.
The equation explaining the structural change in the labour
force is reported on equation(5) in the table. This equation also
2performs well with a high R and low h statistic, but only the 
rate of employment crrowth and the lagged dependent variable are 
significantly different from zero. The lack of significance of 
the unemployment rate variable is surprising, and may be due to 
the use of the linear approximation method. However it may also 
indicate something more fundamental about the structure of the 
model, since u and g both enter here only through the migration 
function. If g is significant and u not, then this may imply that 
pull factors are of greater significance than the disincentive of 
prospective unemployment in influencing the migration decision. 
This interpretation is lent support by the following equation 
which repeats the migration function estimate, but enters the com­
ponents of the probability variable separately:
m = -0.09 + 0.67g + 0.004u + 0.31x10 ^i - 0.4x10 ~*a 
(0.44) (8.8) (0.01) (3.8) (2.23)






























































































Whilst the coefficient on g has a very small standard error, 
that on u is insignificantly different from zero.
These results suggest a new specification for the model, in
which the restriction = 0 is imposed upon the linear system vii
and viii. The model now becomes recursive and can be estimated by
18)
ordinary least squares. The new estimates are reported as equa­
tions (2) and (6). Little difference is made to the quantitative re­
sults reported above by this change of method. However a great 
deal of difference is made to the time path of the unemployment 
rate in the linear model. Now the unemployment rate just rises 
towards a maximum limit as the structural transition of the econo­
my takes place. This can be seen from substitution of equation 
fydii) into equation (vii) (with b̂  = 0) . We then get:
Ut “ Y 0 + Y 19t-1 + Y 2gt + Y 3rt + Y 4xt + Y 5Ut-1 + E 3 (xii)
Here so long as 0 < v_ < 1, as 0, „ -* 0, so u^ . u^.'5 t- 1 t- 1 t
The results for this estimation are reported as equation (4). 
Again, they differ little from equations (1) and (2). The impor­
tance of the rate of external migration is indicated, an increase 
of 1 percentage point in external migration giving rise to a re­
duction of 0.7 percentage points in the unemployment rate in a 
given year, and reducing the equilibrium unemployment rate by 2 
percentage points. A decrease of one-tenth in the intersectoral 
income ratio, by contrast, reduces the unemployment rate in a giv­
en year by only 0.05 percentage points and reduces the equilibrium 
rate by only 0.15 percentage points. Once again the employment 
growth rate appears to have no impact of any statistical signifi­




























































































ment growth performance of the economy following the 1965 reforms 
has little actual bearing upon the issue of the unemployment rate. 
Any reduction of job opportunities, it seems, was offset almost 
entirely by a reduction in the number of migrants seeking social 
sector jobs.
Taking equation (4) as a whole, we can calculate the "equi­
librium" unemployment rate by setting 0 ̂   ̂ = 0, r̂_ = 2 , x̂_ = 0.
The "equilibrium" unemployment rate by this method is 13.6%. Inter­
estingly enough, the unemployment rate for the- five years after 
the end of the estimation period was constant at 12% (from 1978 
to 1982). Whether this reflects a temporary plateau before the 
downturn, as implied by the basic model, or whether it represents 
a more permanent feature of the Yugoslav labour market (as sug­
gested by the "modified" model) we cannot yet tell. The constancy 
of the rate is certainly striking at a time when the EEC countries 
have been experiencing sharp increases in their rates of unemploy­
ment.
Equations (3) and (7} finally, are reported to illustrate the 
possible existence of multicollinearity between the x and r varia­
bles. When either is dropped as an explanatory variable, the co­
efficient and standard error on the other changes. This indica­
tion of some relationship between these variables is hardly sur­
prising and points to the need for further research on the inter­
relationship between internal and external migration.
It is interesting to perform a 'backcast' with the model, 
simulating the effect of a zero external migration rate. In dia­
gram 5 the unemployment rate path over time is displayed. Also
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the simulated values when x = 0. It can be seen that the effect 
of the simulation, of cutting off external migration is to "iron 
out" the dips in the unemployment rate path as it progressed to­
wards its peak values in the late 1970's. But the increase in 
unemployment which results is much less than one would expect by 
just adding on the numbers of workers employed abroad to the do­
mestic unemployment rate. By this procedure one obtains rates 
in excess of 20%. Clearly some substitution between domestic 
and migrant labour was takinq place within the unemployment 
pool.
Conclusion
Far from being associated with an unwillingness to expand, 
the period of open self-management in Yugoslavia has been asso­
ciated with dramatic industrial development and structural 
change. As Flaherty (1982) has pointed out this has also in­
volved a change from import substituting to an export promoting 
strategy of industrialization. We have developed a theory which 
associates rapid economic development, even through various 
changes in strategic economic policy, with a continuously rising 
unemployment rate over a transitional period. At a later stage 
of development this search unemployment associated with demand- 
pull migration may begin to tail off. In Yugoslavia high rates 
of growth of urban labour demand, together with over-protection 
of the industrial sector, a system of industrial organization 
favourable to industrial labour, and "urban bias" (Lipton, 1977) 
in investment policy, led to a consistently maintained gap be­




























































































ployment rose as industrialization proceeded, even though it was 
modified somewhat by opportunities for external migration. As we 
have seen, even faster rates of growth of employment may have 
been expected to have impinged favourably on the unemployment 
picture. But it would have been mistaken to have expected too 
much of such a job-creation policy. Although the migration elas­
ticity was below its critical value, it was nevertheless suffi­
ciently high to ensure that the largest proportion of newly cre­
ated "extra" urban jobs would attract a nearly equal number of 
willing migrants from the rural sector wishing to take advantage 
of the new job opportunities.
Nor did the "open door" policy to the European labour mar­
kets reduce unemployment on a one-to-one basis. External migra­
tion did not proceed exclusively from the ranks of the urban un­
employed. And even where it did there was a plentiful supply of 
new migrants ready to take the place of the departed. By the end 
of the period under study, the unemployment rate had reached a 
height it could have been expected to reach had open socialism 
been a mere figment in the eye of an anti-Stalinist dissident.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the unemployment experience 
was quite different from that which has subsequently caught up 
with the capitalist metropoles of Northern Europe. There an un­
employment of crisis and contraction has been the order of the 
day, with far more serious social and political consequences for 
them than the search unemployment characterising the expansion 






























































































P = total active population, at home and abroad 
X = stock of workers employed abroad 
D = domestic labour force (= P - X)
E = social sector (urban) employment 
U = social sector unemployment 
A = agricultural labour force 
L = E + U = social sector labour force 
M = flow of intersectoral migration
0 = £/L = ratio of agricultural to social sector (industrial) la­
bour force
<j> = X/D = ratio of emigrant to domestic labour force 
u = U/L = social sector unemployment rate 
m = M/A = rate of internal intersectoral migration 
x = X/D = rate of external migration
n = P/P = rate of natural growth of the labour force 
X = proportion of emigrants originating from the social sector
Since the total active population consists of employed work­
ers in the social sector, the agricultural sector and abroad, and 
the unemployed, we may write:
Differentiating with respect to time and dividing through by L 
gives:
P = E + A  + U + X 1
P.P 
P L




























































































P d + X DNow, — = (-----)— = (1 + 4>)(1 + 9) / and the change in the agricul-L D L ,
tural labour force is due to natural growth at a rate n = A^/A, 
migration and emigration so that
A = (A - M - (1 - A )X) n
, . u U L U.. , .Also, since — = — - — = — (1 - u) - a(1 - u), we mav write u U L U
U _ u
U “ u(1 - u)
n (1 + <() ) (1 + 9) = g (1 -u) + n 9 - m 9- (1 - A)x(1 + 9)
u
+ g. Using these relationships, (2) becomes:
+ gu + x(1 + 9) 3.
+ n cf> (1 + 9).
(1 - u)
So that, after some manipulation:
u = (1 - u) { (m - Ax) 9- (g + Ax - n) }
which is equation (iii) in the text.
An expression for 9 can be derived in a similar fashion:
A _ A _ L _ A _ P - A - X .A = A _ P.P X.D
0 “ A L ~ A   ̂ A ’ L A U ’ P L  D L 4.
Thus — = (n - m - (1 - A)x— — t  ^^) (1 + 0) - n (l+tj)) (1 + 0) + x(l+9) 5,
9 9
and after some manipulation we have:
9 = -(1 + 0) { (m - Ax) 9 + x (1 - A) } 






























































































1. There is some debate over the correspondence between the fig­
ures for recorded "job-seekers" and the true amount of unem­
ployment. Shrenk (1979) observes that "these figures must be 
interpreted cautiously: they include not only those that are
openly unemployed but also private farmers seeking employment 
in the social sector and some students" p. 252. Moore (1980) 
however in his careful statistical study of Yugoslav industri­
alization considers that the registered figures "probably un­
derstate the actual levels of unemployment" p. 310. This may 
be due to non-registration on account of the limited coverage 
of means-tested unemployment benefits. Mesa-Lago (1971) sug­
gests that the two effects more or less balance each other.
In the job-search model developed below, the official category 
seems a reasonable proxy to the related true unemployment sta­
tistic.
2. Some positive economic benefits of external migration include 
the boost to the balance of payments due to worker remittanc­
es, whilst a serious adverse effect concerns the loss of 
skilled manpower resources to Yugoslav industry, see Baucic 
(1972) .
3. A comprehensive account can be found in Ireland and Law (1983).
4. It should be noted however that there is a body of opinion 
which does not accept that the Yugoslav industrial sector can 
be usefully described as being composed of a set of labour- 




























































































the multiplicity of goals of the Yugoslav firm, whilst Moore 
(1980) regards self-management institutions as a cosmetic ve­
neer covering an essentially centrally directed economic 
mechanism.
5. It should be noted that these results conflict with the gen­
eral equilibrium analysis of Dreze (1976) who demonstrates 
the long-run equivalence between a labour-managed economy and 
a capitalist economy, under general competitive equilibrium.
6. Calculated from table 3 of Sapir (1980). Primary data from 
Statisti£ki GodiSnjak, index of output for the manufacturing 
sector, value added (drustveni proizvod). The output of the 
social sector as a whole fell less precipitously.
7. Calculated from Sapir, table 3.
8. Calculated from OECD (1981) table G.
9. Data taken from World Bank (1981) table 2 (Annex). Only 
those countries for which data was available for both periods 
have been included in the sample. "Middle income developing 
countries" are those which had per capita income over #370.
10. The largest 100 Yugoslav firms employ 43% of industrial work­
ers, whereas the corresponding proportion in the USA is only 
25% (Sacks, 1982). Although Yugoslav firms tend to be large, 
divisionalization into BOAL1s has produced a counter-tendency 
towards decentralization within firms.
11. Similar approaches have proved fruitful in studies of labour 





























































































12. This model is derived from Todaro (1969, 1976). It has been 
applied to other peripheral European economies : to Spain by 
Garcia-Ferrer (1980) and to Italy by Salvatore (1980). It 
has also been applied to Yugoslavia by Sapir (1981) but his 
results differ significantly from those presented here and 
failed to explain unemployment, as the mean percentage error 
of the predicted value of unemployment under dynamic simula­
tion was over 100%.
13. A recent study by Wyzan (1982) finds no evidence of any rela­
tionship between social sector incomes and labour market con­
ditions in the post 1965 period. This conclusion is substan­
tiated by the results of an econometric investigation of the 
Phillips-curve relationship for Yugoslavia.
14. In the latter part of our period, Social Compacts were in 
force which stipulated employment targets to enterprises.
For the period 1953-71 a regression of the following form:
(Share of industry output in GDP) = a + a (In time) gives
_2 0 1 an P of 0.92. If industrial output shows a strong time
trend, then it is likely that industrial employment will
too, as the two are closely correlated (Dubey, 1975).
1 5 . Sapir (1981) concludes that "it would appear that fluctua­
tions in the level of external migration were basically de­
termined by the situation prevailing on the German labour 
market" (p. 164).
16. An extended model might attempt to endogenize some of these 




























































































17- Sapir (1981) reports results for a similar equation over the 
period 1954-1972. His equation is:
m = 3.218n - 0.011p - 0.02i - 0.012 DUM3 
(3.33) (2.57) (4.14) (2.32)
2R =0.65; D-W =1.49
with associated elasticities of the rate of migration with 
respect to job probabilities of 0.1 (much lower than ours) 
and for wages of 1.0 (ours would be 1.2). However there 
are differences in the definition of variables: m includes
external migrants originating from the agricultural sector, 
and i is the average wage of unskilled workers alone. DUM3 
is a dummy variable representing the 1965 reforms, on the 
argument that this represents "a downward shift in the ex­
pectation of finding a job". But this, of course, would be 
picked up by the p variable itself. (The ambiguity over 
the sign pattern is due to misprints in the original arti­
cle but should presumably read +, +, -.)
18. OLS yields consistent and unbiased estimators in a recursive 
system with lagged endogenous variables so long as the error 
terms do not exhibit serial correlation (see Dhrymes, 1970, 
p. 170). Fortunately, in the present case examination of the 
h-statistic shows that serial correlation is absent.
19. The expost forecast for 1977 to 1981 is also shown, and can 
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P : Total Population, including workers overseas.
For 1964-1966, 1967-1979 from OECD 1973, 1980.
For 1957-1963 from
X : Stock of Yugoslav workers employed abroad.
For 1957-1966, Baleti6 and Baucic.
For 1967-1977, OECD 1980.
E : Social sector employment, from Baletic and Baucic.
U : Registered unemployment, from SGJ, 1958, 1967, 1974, 1979.
D : Net domestic population => P, - X .t t
A : Agricultural labour force = D - E^ - U .
0 : Sectoral composition of the labour force = A^/CE^ + U ).
u : Social sector (urban) unemployment rate = U./(E. + IF).t t t
p : Probability of getting a job = Ae /Ut_1 .
This is strictly speaking a parameter of the probability 
distribution of the waiting time to employment so 0 / p / 1. 
m : Rate of rural - urban migration : 
mfc = ALfc - (0.01)(Lfc_1) + 0.4 (AXfc)
We subtract 0.01 from the increase in social sector
workforce on the assumption that the natural rate of popu­
lation growth is around 1% p.a. over the period (Schrenk et 
al. p. 278). This represents a rough compromise between the 
1.25% of the less developed regions and the 0.5% of the more 
developed. In addition we must add back the 40% of annual 
external migration which originated from the social sector 
(Schrenk p. 266).
g : Growth of social sector employment; g = AE .
V i






























































































SI AIH H AI R. EXR
1957 1728 2808 3.29 853 2.03
1958 1812 2531 3.19 793 2.28 2.10
1959 2124 2979 3.12 955 2.22 2.40
1960 2436 2907 2.99 972 2.51 3.28
1961 2640 3261 2.83 1152 2.29 2.66
1962 2904 3564 2.78 1282 2.27 0.63
1963 3420 4496 2.77 1623 2.10 0.66
1964 4344 6078 2.66 2285 1.90 1.82
1965 6012 5799 2.62 2213 2.72 0.55
1966 8316 7577 2.65 2859 2.91 -0.88
1967 9444 6879 2.68 2567 3.68 -0.26
1968 10344 6591 2.61 2525 4.10 0.33
1969 11880 8042 2.48 3243 3.66 1.38
1970 14076 8960 2.31 3879 3.63 1.80
1971 17184 10303 2.16 4770 3.60 2.26
1972 20112 14807 2.04 7258 2.77 1.48
1973 23256 18386 1.91 9626 2.42 0.58
1974 29724 21310 1.81 11773 2.52 1.10
1975 36720 25632 1.70 15078 2.44 1.02
1976 42420 29952 1.62 18489 2.29 0.58
1977 50376 37087 1.51 24561 2.05 0.64
Sources and Definitions
SI : Social sector personal incomes.
From SGJ 1967 (122-1); 1975 (123-1); 1979 (123-1) and National 
Bank of Yugoslavia Annual Report 1983 (units new dinars per 




























































































AI : Agricultural sector per family income, income from holding,
from SGJ 1962 (205-57); 1967 (107-55); 1971 (107-55);
1973 (107-55); 1976 (107-52); 1974 (107-52).
Income from holding includes both cash sales and own product.
H ; Average number of active workers per household. In 1964 there
were 1.69 m. holdings of size 2 ha. or over (S.H. Franklin).
(On smaller holdings, the greater part of the income is
earned off the farm as these mini-holdings are uneconomic).
We divide the total active agricultural population by this
figure to arrive at farm workforce per farm, H = ____A____ .
1,690,000
AI : Agricultural sector personal incomes,
AI = AIH .
H
R : Relative urban-rural incomes, R = £[I .
AI
EXR : Expected urban-rural income differentials, EXR = p.R.
DATA SOURCES
Data were derived from the following tables in Statiskicki 
Godisnjak Jugoslavije:
Employment : 1966, 104-2; 1967, 105-2; 1979, 105-2.
Unemployment ; 1967, 104-11; 1976, 105-13; 1979 , 105-13.
Urban incomes : 1967, 122-1; 1975, 123-1; 1979, 123-1.
Rural incomes ; 1962, 205-57; 1967, 107-55; 1971 , 107-55;
1973, 107-55; 1976, 107-52; 1979 , 107-52.
Data on active population were derived from OECD "Yugoslavia",
1973 (table G) , 1980 (table H) •
Data on external migration and social sector employment were 
derived from Baletic, Z. and Baucic, I., "Population, Labour 





























































































Data on farm workforce were derived from S.H. Franklin, 
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